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In recent years, resilience has become a key term in disaster risk management (DRM). Its potential 
has been mainly discussed with respect to social-ecological systems as well as communities. 
With respect to Critical Infrastructures (CIs) however, resilience and vulnerability are often used 
without clear definition and reference to the DRM context. This paper aims to conceptualize 
vulnerability and resilience for the CI context. Building on socio-ecological approaches, the paper 
will outline the added value that a more stringent conceptualization of resilience offers for DRM of 
CIs. After an introduction of CIs and their meaning in the context of DRM (Section 1), the distinct 
features of the resilience concept and its application in different disciplines are presented (Section 
2). Some of the governance challenges associated with the implementation of resilience strategies 
are presented (Section 3) before conclusions are drawn (Section 4).
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The recognition of risk as a social construct became one basis 
for the development of a certain stream of risk assessment 
methodologies and DRM approaches (e.g. Blaikie et al., 1994; 
Alexander, 2000; Birkmann, 2013). In this context, different 
terminologies and concepts such as vulnerability (Birkmann, 
2013), sensitivity (Füssel & Klein, 2006), resilience (Paton & 
Johnston, 2000; Klein et al., 2003; Adger et al., 2005; Cutter et 
al., 2008) or adaptation and adaptive capacity (Pelling, 2011; Smit 
& Wandel, 2006) have been developed from related disciplines. 
Discussions with respect to their delineation, overlap and 
applicability are ongoing (Cutter et al., 2008; Cardona, 2011; 
Birkmann, 2013). 
Definition and translation of these theoretical concepts into 
indicators and criteria form an important part of disaster 
risk assessments and are a priority of the Hyogo Framework 
for Action (UNISDR, 2007). In this respect, different spheres 
of interest have been identified that encompass economic, 
environmental and social dimensions (Cardona & Barbat, 2000; 
Birkmann, 2013; Cardona, 2011). Defined as “…an asset or part 
thereof… which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal 
functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being 
of people” (EC, 2008: Article 2a), Critical Infrastructure (CI) can 
be identified as a cross-cutting topic for all three spheres. 
In parallel to these discourses in the DRM community, CIs 
have gained political importance in the wake of terror attacks 
in 2001 (World Trade Center), 2004 (Madrid) and 2005 (London) 
(FMIG, 2009; Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 
2009; HM Government, 2010). These events both shifted the 
focus of DRM activities and reshaped the CI context, through 
increasing awareness of the complexity and interrelatedness 
of infrastructures as socio-technical systems (e.g. Rinaldi et 
al., 2001; IRGC, 2006; Kröger, 2008; Serre et al., 2013) and the 
increasing likelihood of cascading effects reaching beyond 
geographical and functional borders (Boin & McConnell, 2007; 
Hémond & Robert, 2012; Lhomme et al., 2013). 
The strengthening of infrastructures has been identified as an 
important field for disaster risk reduction (e.g. UNISDR, 2007). 
However, CI and DRM terminologies and methodologies have 
not fully been integrated, resulting in inconsistent labeling, 
conceptualization and implementation of disaster risk-related 
CI activities and governance approaches. Accordingly, it is the 
aim of this paper to apply methodological discussions on DRM 
conceptualizations to CIs, in order to underline the advantages 
of the resilience concept for this specific context as well as to 
discuss potential governance challenges.
2. from crITIcAl InfrAsTrucTure 
ProTecTIon To resIlIence
In the context of DRM, the resilience concept is variously 
viewed as supplementary to (Gallopín, 2006), overlapping with 
(Cutter et al., 2008) or the flip-side of (Folke et al., 2002) existing 
concepts such as vulnerability. In the following, we will analyze 
the specificities offered by the resilience concept as well as its 
application in the development of strategies. 
2.1 The resIlIence concePT
The resilience approach was initially used in the fields of 
psychology (e.g. Garmezy et al., 1984; Rutter, 1985) and ecology 
(e.g. Holling, 1973), amongst others. In ecology, when considering 
systemic interactions, the term ‘resilience’ addresses the ability 
of ecosystems to absorb fluctuations while persisting. This 
was a departure from the traditional view that had equated the 
optimum ecological state with stability—a departure deemed 
necessary in order to address the behavior of nonlinear systems 
(Holling, 1973). Socio-ecological resilience research focuses 
on the relevance of renewal, reorganization and development 
(Holling, 2001; Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Berkes et al., 2008), 
arguing that resilience increases the likelihood for desirable 
pathways under changing and sometimes even unpredictable 
conditions (Walker et al., 2004; Adger et al., 2005; Folke, 2006). 
Accordingly, non-linear developments (which might also be 
generated through infrastructure breakdowns) became part of 
the analysis (Folke, 2006). The Resilience Alliance defined the 
term as: 
“The ability to absorb disturbances, to be 
changed and then to re-organise and still have 
the same identity (retain the same basic struc-
ture and ways of functioning). It includes the 
ability to learn from the disturbance. A resil-
ient system is forgiving of external shocks. As 
resilience declines, the magnitude of a shock 
from which it cannot recover gets smaller and 
smaller. Resilience shifts attention from purely 
growth and efficiency to needed recovery and 
flexibility. Growth and efficiency alone can of-
ten lead ecological systems, businesses and 
societies into fragile rigidities, exposing them 
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to turbulent transformation. Learning, recov-
ery and flexibility open eyes to novelty and 
new worlds of opportunity.” 1
Counter to this, the equilibrium approach to resilience played an 
important role in many disciplines and has substantially shaped 
natural resource and environmental management. Traditional 
engineering resilience approaches often focus on maintaining 
efficiency and the constancy of a system close to a single steady 
state (see Holling, 1996 and Table 1). This aspect can also be 
found in more recent engineering literature stressing the control 
over the system in order to avoid failure. Vugrin et al., (2010), for 
example, define CI resilience as: 
“Given the occurrence of a particular disrup-
tive event (or set of events), the resilience of a 
system to that event (or events) is the ability to 
efficiently reduce both the magnitude and du-
ration of the deviation from targeted system 
performance levels” (p.82).
According to them, CI resilience comprises two main measurable 
components: a—the system impact, defined as the difference 
between general and actual (after event) performance; and b—the 
recovery effort, encompassing the resources required to restore 
the functioning to a pre-defined desirable performance level. 
This engineering driven approach thus neglects the potential for 
flexibility and change of the system. It relates resilience to the 
capabilities of systems or networks, elements often expressed 
in terms such as robustness, redundancy or others (Tierney & 
Bruneau, 2007). In these approaches, resilience assessments 
were and still are in many contexts addressing the physical 
conditions of systems while neglecting different aspects and 
phases of disaster management (see e.g. Hartong et al., 2008, 
Svensson 2008, Bompard et al., 2009, Rich et al., 2009, Gheorghe 
and Vamanu 2005 and 2008, Petit et al., 2011, Kröger and Zio 
2011, Li et al., 2012). 
Table 1: Concepts of resilience in the socio-ecological context
Resilience 





















































Source: adapted from Folke (2006: 259).
1  http://www.resalliance.org/index.php/resilience
As indicated in Table 1 the resilience concepts used in the 
socio-ecological context allow for the consideration of 
systemic feedbacks and cross-scale dynamic interactions as 
well as (institutional) learning, which can also be transferred 
to CIs. 
2.2 InfrAsTrucTure ProTecTIon: The Added vAlue 
of The resIlIence concePT
Applying the concept of resilience as defined in the socio-
ecological approach to CIs can be of great value. Shifting 
the focus away from the maintenance and equilibrium of the 
infrastructure system towards the delivery of system services 
and its external relations permits a better consideration 
of external effects and changes as well as interaction with 
other systems, in this case society. Gallopín (2006) suggests 
that the interaction of external and internal processes needs 
to be considered since stress can be triggered by changes 
in the system environment, by internal alterations, or both. 
With respect to CIs, a variety of system challenges can be 
identified. They include: the increasing (inter-)dependencies 
of and between infrastructure systems (e.g. Rinaldi et al., 
2001); technological changes and the integration of smaller 
into larger systems, thus increasing system complexity and 
allowing for far-reaching disturbances (Kröger, 2008: 1781); 
the privatization of infrastructures (Gheorghe et al., 2006: xiv; 
Kröger, 2008: 178,); the liberalization of markets, leading to 
an increasing number of actors (Gheorghe et al., 2006: xi ff); 
and changes in demand patterns (Kröger, 2008; IRGC, 2010). 
Additionally, changes in system set-up and governance, and 
global changes including the increasing use of renewable 
energies, urbanization processes and demographic changes, 
also shape CI resilience.
Besides these changes, the resilience concept also allows for 
the consideration of unexpected events such as the 2004 boxing 
day tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 or the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake and following tsunami. In some cases, unexpected 
disruptions may occur due to miscalculations in design. The 
Fukushima earthquake and tsunami for example were both 
larger than had been anticipated in the design of Japanese 
power plants (Bunn & Heinonen, 2011: 1580) representing a 
mismatch of design structures and the spectrum of plausible 
hazards. Incorporating the resilience concept in this case would 
ideally have led to the integration of ‘safe failure’ into the design 
structures, and a higher degree of flexibility to account for a 
diversity of hazards. In other cases, unexpected disruptions 
may be the result of cascading effects caused by increasing 
interdependencies and complexities (Rinaldi et al., 2001; IRGC, 
2006; Boin & McConnell, 2007; Kröger, 2008; Hémond & Robert 
2012; Lhomme et al., 2013): in this example, the dependency 
of tsunami height on the magnitude of the earthquake, and 
the interdependencies of the cooling system with electricity 
production, water pollution, back-up systems, blocked traffic 
routes and fire-brigade services. A DRM strategy informed by 
resilience would specifically design and implement measures 
that take the interlinkages between different infrastructures into 
account, as opposed to a DRM strategy that devises a separate 
strategy or analysis for each system. 
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Nevertheless, assessment methodologies and measures 
to address CI disruptions still mainly build on the notion 
of stability and robustness defined in specific scenarios 
(e.g. Greenberg et al., 2007; EC, 2009; Reed et al., 2009) 
while neglecting systemic changes and unexpected events. 
Although many assessments do encompass multi-hazard 
approaches, they are still creating blind spots and potential 
new vulnerabilities by not integrating resilience aspects into 
their assessments (Perelman, 2006). In this regard, resilience 
strategies need to incorporate uncertainties (or the so-called 
‘soft paradigm’: Perelman, 2006). In its simplest form, this 
would mean having a “Plan B” in the event of failure (Tierney 
& Bruneau, 2007), or a range of options to be taken. Another 
strategy is to design ‘safe failure’ or ‘graceful degradation’ 
into systems, so that they continue to operate in the event of 
failure in one or more components (Tyler & Moench, 2012). 
Another approach is to openly encourage flexibility, for 
instance, encouraging people to embrace uncertainty rather 
than insisting on 100% certainty or even a predictable future 
and security. 
2.2.1 cI/humAn InTerAcTIon As PArT of The resIl-
Ience concePT
Many approaches in the disaster risk reduction area are still 
sector-specific, focussing on the vulnerability of a particular 
type of system/CI (e.g. Hartong et al., 2008; Svensson, 2008; 
Bompard et al., 2009; Rich et al., 2009; Gheorghe & Vamanu, 
2005, 2008; Petit et al., 2011; Kröger & Zio, 2011; Li et al., 
2012). Although the respective research is valuable in order 
to learn more about the individual system characteristics and 
potential disaster risk reduction measures, the implications 
for society are often unclear. However, the operation of CIs 
determines the functioning of many societies (e.g. FMIG, 
2009; DHS, 2009; Cabinet Office, 2010); therefore, a broader 
perspective is required, that addresses the societal effects. 
The resilience concept offers the possibility to include societal 
aspects by taking into account the ability to absorb external 
shocks2. This is specifically relevant as the social effects 
of an infrastructure breakdown are mainly determined 
by the level of dependence on an uninterrupted 
supply, or by the level of preparedness (Toubin et al., 
2014). Paradoxically, high levels of supply security 
lead to complacency within the population and thus 
an unpreparedness towards potential failures (FMIG, 
2009; Reichenbach et al., 2008). 
Taking electricity supply failure as an example, not all 
households and facilities are equally affected. While a 
shortfall of electricity supply can have life-threatening 
effects in hospitals (where emergency power supply 
might be insufficient) (Aghababian, 1994: 773; Klein et 
al., 2005: 343) and geriatric homes with patients dependent 
on artificial respiration, a household of middle-aged adults 
might be relatively unaffected. Additionally, preparedness 
levels, e.g. with respect to the availability of back-up facilities, 
2  See the Resilience Alliance website: http://www.resalliance.org/index.php/
resilience
will differ and thus influence overall CI-human resilience.
2.3 develoPmenT of crITIcAl InfrAsTrucTure resIl-
Ience sTrATegIes
Although the protection of strategically important facilities has 
always been an important part of national defense strategies 
(Hellström, 2007; Lauwe & Riegel, 2008), the beginning 
of the 21st century saw a change in the nature of perceived 
threats, with natural hazards and terrorism now the focus of 
security debates (Lauwe & Riegel, 2008). The importance of CI 
protection escalated through the 2001, 2004 and 2005 terror 
attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid and London, as well 
as in response to a number of disasters such as Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 or the UK flooding in 2007. Against this 
changing landscape, societies have become highly vulnerable 
towards a broad and diffuse spectrum of possible threats 
(Brunner & Suter, 2008; Her Majesty the Queen in Right of 
Canada, 2009: 4; HM Government, 2010). 
The first generation of policies addressing CI disruptions in 
this changed threat context was a set of Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) strategies. The focus on protection was 
mainly considered from an all-hazards perspective: 
“…the objectives of the EPCIP [European Pro-
gramme for Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion] will be to continue to identify critical 
infrastructure, analyse vulnerability and in-
terdependence, and come forward with so-
lutions to protect from, and prepare for, all 
hazards.” (EC, 2004: 8)
The protection was seen as the way to reduce, sometimes to 
totally eliminate, the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure 
systems, mainly seen as the physical assets or components 
of an infrastructure. In this context, the vulnerability 
of CIs was defined as a “weakness in the system of the 
critical infrastructure in itself, which might be exploited, 
unintentionally or intentionally” (Bouchon, 2006: 80). 
Nevertheless, during the last decade, CI disruption issues 
became more integrated into DRM approaches (see Figure 1). 
This increase in awareness on the importance of CI resilience, 
triggered by a variety of events such as the 2003 Northeastern 
blackout in the US and Canada, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
the 2007 UK flooding as well as the overall awareness of 
the potential effects of climate change (City of Cape Town, 
2006; German Federal Government, 2008), was accompanied 
by a shift from direct protection and prosecution to a more 
systemic view of infrastructures in certain countries. It was 
characterized by the insight that rather than focussing on 
the protection of certain facilities, the safeguarding of the 
provision of services should be the primary aim. In particular, 
the Nordic countries focused on critical societal functions 
(Norwegian CIP Commission, 2006) or functions vital to society 
(Government of Finland, 2006). 


























3. dIscussIng crITIcAl InfrAsTrucTure 
resIlIence ImPlemenTATIon 
chAllenges
Having looked into the development of CI resilience strategies, 
the variety of nomenclature is striking and increases the 
challenges in implementing resilience strategies such as 
1—cooperation and communication among the multiplicity of 
stakeholders, 2—understanding system characteristics, and 
3—the integration of citizens into resilience building. 
3.1 cooPerATIon And communIcATIon Among The 
mulTIPlIcITy of sTAkeholders
In the field of CI strategies, the main challenge raised by gov-
ernance is related to the need to involve very different types 
of stakeholders: the population, public authorities (from dif-
ferent jurisdictions), private operators, operators from differ-
ent sectors, the media, etc.. This need has been articulated in 
the concept of network governance proposed by Suter (2011). 
Each group of stakeholders has its own interests, and hence 
its own understanding of what it means to achieve resilience. 
Potential conflicts may arise, for instance when business in-
terests are not compatible with public security. The role of 
the State with respect to CIs changes when liberalization or 
privatization occurs: it can no longer directly influence the 
setup and governance of the CI system, but rather has to fo-
cus on setting framework conditions for production processes 
Some recent documents include resilience terminology in 
strategic approaches (City of New York, 2013; Cabinet Office, 
2010; Scottish Government, 2011; Australian Government, 
2010; DHS & Public Safety Canada, 2009; Her Majesty the 
Queen in Right of Canada, 2009; NIAC, 2009). However, in 
others the resilience approach is not referred to (e.g. EC, 2008) 
or is used in a misleading way in what should be referred to 
as protection strategies (e.g. The White House, 2013). This 
is astonishing not only since the scientific debate has been 
well developed, but because resilience-based approaches 
have been found to be substantially less expensive than 
investments into structural updates (de Bruijne & van Eeten, 
2007: 24). Although resilience aspects such as education 
and training or specific response and recovery efforts are 
integrated into some strategies (e.g. DHS, 2009), societal 
resilience encompassing efforts and planning activities of 
communities and businesses is frequently neglected (Boin 
& McConnell, 2007: 54 ff; Pursiainen, 2007: 31 ff). Finally, 
most CI DRM strategies still fail to integrate insecurities and 
to explicitly address the potential unexpectedness of events. 
In this respect, the development of more comprehensive and 
integrated resilience approaches taking into account different 
spatial and content-related levels (e.g. changes in socio-
technical landscapes, patchworks of standards and regimes 
or action of individuals) are needed (Hellström, 2007). 
Although some guidelines take these aspects into account 
(e.g. TISP, 2006; TNO, 2011), a variety of challenges remain for 
regional, national and local strategies (Balsells et al., 2013; 
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Figure 1: Development of Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategies. Source: authors.
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and markets and subsequently organizing and moderating 
negotiations between different stakeholders (Abbate, 1999; 
de Bruijne & van Eeten, 2007; Monstadt, 2008; Toubin et al., 
2014). The provision of CI services is, however, mainly in the 
hands of privately organized operators. 
The collaboration between the different stakeholders 
requires adequate collaboration schemes, where each group 
of stakeholders feels that its own interests are taken into 
account (win-win situations). The need for cooperation was 
already identified by the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) (1997). Such public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) are already operational, for instance, 
in Scotland, where the regional Critical Infrastructure 
Strategy is based on a Critical Infrastructure Partnership 
Framework between Government and those responsible for 
the critical assets “…to minimise disruption to any part of that 
infrastructure or to any of our communities living and working 
across Scotland” (Scottish Government, 2011: 27). In the case 
where the interests of each group of stakeholders are not 
taken on board, the strategy elaborated may compromise 
the achievement of the expected results, as in the example 
of the 2008 European Directive on European Critical 
Infrastructure (ECI). The Directive defined security measures 
to be implemented by the ECI operators; however, the 
operators had little input on the accuracy of these measures, 
whose implementation they had to pay for (Bouchon, 2011). 
This was one of the main factors triggering a revision of the 
Directive. Resilience measures should thus be the result of a 
participative process to ensure better acceptance.
In the case of Norway, CI resilience is achieved through meas-
ures implemented by responsible owners, taking into account 
the needs defined by their customers, and on the basis of 
goals, expectations and regulations defined by the responsi-
ble authorities, within a system of risk governance defined by 
the government (Thomassen, 2012). However, adequate gov-
ernance models to achieve CI resilience in different contexts 
remain to be developed. The main challenges in this regard 
include: the identification of the right number of stakeholders 
(not too few, not too many); the types of collaboration process 
to be developed (e.g. protocols, informal discussions, exercis-
es, etc.); and the degree of formalization of this process (poli-
cies with a normative goal vs. processes based on a voluntary, 
informal, or horizontal way of collaboration). 
If CIR stakeholder collaboration is to prove efficient in 
addressing the resilience and protection issues (Bouchon & 
Dimauro, 2012; Bouchon et al., 2012), it is fundamental that the 
interest of participants be maintained by taking into account 
their needs and perspectives, and also that the necessary 
funding be generated. New synergies and innovative co-
financing strategies, involving the participation of both public 
and private actors, need to be explored in this regard.
The adoption and the development of adequate technologies 
and communication systems are particularly relevant to CI 
Resilience collaboration processes: they are the key factors 
to secure the exchange of information. Large, monolithic and 
costly integrated platforms are not in line with the needs of 
authorities and operators. On the contrary, technological 
innovations should be directed to gain opportunities for 
economy of scale and investment sustainability, thanks to 
modular interoperable and reconfigurable solutions.
A key element of successful stakeholder collaborations is 
communication between the stakeholders (IRGC, 2006). 
Communication is principally a question of defining 
responsibilities, roles, duties and obligations with respect 
to specific procedures and crisis situations. The challenges 
of CI governancealready substantial in business as 
usual, scenarios against the background of liberalized 
markets and the privatization of the provision of services 
(Kröger, 2008)are only intensified in times of crisis when 
specific needs arise but responsibilities and cooperation 
potential remain unclear. For example, Hurricane Katrina 
showed that the disaster management mechanisms in place 
were not sufficient, despite the fact that new strategies had 
been implemented after 9/11 (Wise, 2006). Although the 
unexpected breakdown of communications technology played 
an important role in turning the natural hazard into a disaster 
situation, confusion about responsibilities and the interaction 
of departments and officials contributed significantly (ibid.: 
304). Since communication always involves the exchange of 
information, it is important to address the type of information 
that can be exchanged (e.g. intelligence or commercially 
sensitive information) and technical questions related to the 
information exchange, such as protection measures, secure 
information sharing platforms and their limitations in DRM.
Finally, decision-making processes also pose a challenge to 
resilience building. This encompasses decision-taking as well 
as the financing, implementation and monitoring of decisions 
taken. It is also necessary to determine how decisions can be 
taken. For example, who should make decisions regarding 
resilience levels and acceptable risks? Ensuring the delivery 
of certain infrastructure services during times of crisis 
necessarily implies the prioritization of available resources; 
however, the criteria under which such prioritization 
processes can be organized, and who should make such 
decisions, remain unclear. Public discussion about possible 
limits of protection and target levels of risk can contribute to 
addressing this challenge and could serve as a stimulus for 
multi-stakeholder communication about risks (Fekete et al., 
2012; Fekete, 2012).
3.2 undersTAndIng sysTem chArAcTerIsTIcs
A second governance challenge that is closely related to 
communication between stakeholders is related to the 
collection of relevant information to characterize the CI 
systems and their interdependencies. Stakeholders need to 
understand their dependence on certain CI services as well 
as their own role in the functioning of other infrastructure 
services. Such system characteristics can be identified in a 
hazard independent manner with the help of scenarios. 
Some cases show that building PPPs, as mentioned above, 
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area in which the State should assume greater responsibility 
(Duckworth, 2012). Accordingly, analysis of how top-down and 
bottom-up approaches can be matched is required.
Community resilience including the bottom-up approach is 
not a new concept, and has in fact been widely applied in the 
DRM community (Magis, 2010; Cutter et al., 2008; Paton & 
Johnston, 2000, 2006; Tobin, 1999), for example with respect 
to empowerment, education, access to institutions and 
resources (Edwards, 2009). With respect to the failure of CIs, 
however, the concept has only recently been applied.
Citizens can not only improve their own resilience by these 
measures but also serve as a source of information for civil 
protection agencies. People can provide relevant information 
to allow first responders to identify what is happening, where 
the priorities are, and what types of resources need to be mo-
bilized. This may entail, for instance, analyzing information 
circulating among social networks, although this raises the 
question of validating and guaranteeing the accuracy of the in-
formation (e.g. Australian Emergency Management Institute, 
2013). 
4. conclusIon
The term ‘resilience’ is increasingly used for CI-related DRM 
strategies. However, it is applied in a variety of contexts and 
scales, often without a clear and stringent definition. This 
results in confusion around its meaning, so that it becomes 
difficult to understand what is meant when a resilience 
strategy is presented. This failure to clearly define the concept 
may mean that the actions and activities deriving from it 
fail to increase resilience. With respect to society and CIs, 
resilience strategies need to integrate the potential failure 
of infrastructure services instead of focussing only on their 
robustness and reliability. Relating resilience to concepts 
used in the DRM community and specifically to aspects of 
socio-ecological resilience facilitates the interrelation of 
technical systems while taking into account unexpected 
events—at least from a theoretical point of view. In order 
to operationalize a resilience framework for CIs towards 
natural hazards, further research is required . Although some 
current research projects address the general question of 
conceptualizing resilience in different contexts (e.g. the FP7 
project EmBrace) and some valuable examples have been 
presented, for instance by TISP (2006), the operationalization 
potential for the CI context remains vague. 
The implementation of resilience strategies by concrete 
measures and monitoring activities remains a challenge. In 
this regard, indicators of the efficiency of resilience strategies 
would be needed to evaluate results and to benchmark 
different approaches in order to generate arguments in favor 
of appropriate action. Difficulties in collecting and updating 
relevant data and information (Trucco et al., 2011, Robert 
& Morabito, 2010) are an obstacle to progress in this area. 
Technical solutions establishing a trustable and secure 
environment to exchange data and other information among 
different operators such as policy makers and operators can 
creates a trusted environment for information exchange that 
allows better understanding of the system characteristics. 
Examples have been developed in the Netherlands (Luiijf et 
al., 2003), Canada (Robert & Morabito, 2010), in Scotland, or 
in Lombardy, Italy (Bouchon et al., 2012). In this last example, 
transportation and energy operators, in collaboration with the 
regional Civil Protection authorities, started working in 2009 
to increase their knowledge of the existing interdependencies 
characterizing the Transportation and Energy critical systems 
for the Lombardy Region: on the basis of questionnaires, 
direct interviews and process mapping, operators were 
requested to provide information about critical infrastructures 
nodes, accident and service disruption events, maintenance, 
and crisis management internal processes and systems in 
order to understand fallout effects. A simulation of functional 
vulnerabilities and interdependencies has also been 
developed to support the programme activities (Trucco et 
al., 2011; Cagno et al., 2011). As a result of these cooperation 
efforts, the Lombardy Region Authorities have developed 
an emergency communication and information-sharing 
framework. The operators contributed to the identification of 
the relevant communication flows and channels under different 
emergency conditions and type of events. For example, in the 
scenario of heavy snowfall, the operators could state the kind 
of information they needed (e.g. very precise meteorological 
predictions), the information they could provide (particularly 
information that could have an impact for the other operators) 
and the role they expected the regional crisis management 
centre to play (e.g. to communicate with the public).
3.3 InTegrATIon of cITIzens InTo resIlIence buIldIng
A third important point that needs to be considered in the 
context of CI resilience building is the incorporation of civil 
society. In this regard, citizens should be understood to 
be consumers and tax-payers, and thus stakeholders. It is 
therefore fundamental to communicate the CI decisions 
to be taken, particularly those decisions that concern the 
communities. 
Since CI resilience should focus on maintaining the provision 
of certain infrastructure services, it is important to have infor-
mation about specific dependencies (with respect to citizens 
but also regarding public facilities such as hospitals, transport 
systems, etc.). At the same time, it is equally important to view 
citizens as active contributors towards civil protection. For ex-
ample, the principle underlying the Australian approach to CIR 
is that “communities are the heart of the resilience process” 
(Duckworth, 2012). For people to prepare for and respond to 
emergencies, people must understand the risks they live with. 
When they understand the risks, they need to be empowered 
to take action to deal with them. Governments cannot make 
people resilient, but they can help by providing information and 
ongoing support (e.g. Cabinet Office, 2013). Building resilience 
is a “bottom-up” process and governments as well as regional 
authorities need to agree on a communication framework to 
inform and engage people about risk. Although everyone must 
take into account the possibility of deficiencies in deliveries 
of services on which they are critically dependent, this is one 
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